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Specially Respecting the Living Human Embryo by
Adhering to Standard Human Subject Experimentation
Rules
Samuel B. Casey, J.D.* and Nathan A. Adams, IV, J.D., Ph.D."
The being that is now you or me is the same being that was once an
adolescent, and before that a toddler, and before that an infant, and
before that a fetus, and before that an embryo. To have destroyed the
being that, is you or me at any of these stages would have been to destroy
you or me.
The debate about whether to federally fund human embryonic stem
cell research is at root a controversy about the legal status that should be
accorded the human embryo. The undisputed, scientifically verifiable facts
agreed to by even the most liberal proponents of human embryonic stem
cell research are that (1) the embryo is living and genetically unique;2 (2)
the embryo is human and capable of developing into an adult;3 and (3)
derivation of human stem cells from embryos terminates them. Although
philosophical and political disagreement subsequently arises about
whether the embryo should be deemed a juridical person, quasi-person, or5
non-person, we have not adequately addressed the significance of these
three undisputed facts for regulating embryonic stem cell research.
On August 9, 2001, President Bush directed the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) to approve limited federal funding for
research on then sixty stem cell lines derived with the "informed consent"
of parents who authorized the termination of their embryos.6 By informed
consent, the Bush Administration meant "informed proxy consent" like the
Clinton Administration before it.7 Yet, no court has ever found proxy
consent adequate to justify ultra-hazardous, non-therapeutic research on
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incompetent living human subjects. Proxy consent to non-therapeutic
research thwarts the underlying objectives of the informed consent
doctrine applicable to human subject experimentation, including
preserving autonomy, self-determination, liberty, and equality. Indeed, the
very term "proxy informed consent" is doctrinally oxymoronic and must be
recognized as a serious threat to all incompetent human subjects.
Strong legal and policy reasons exist to treat the living human embryo
as something more than mere tissue, if not subject to the Federal Policy for
the Protection of Human Subjects, including subpart A and subpart B,8 or
to amended regulations providing greater protection than the fetal tissue
research regulations, which the National Institutes of Health (NIH) prefers
to invoke.9 A living human is more analogous to a "human subject" than
human tissue. Categorizing the embryo as mere tissue does not recognize
the special status of the human embryo, which a majority of Americans
acknowledge,10 and instead renders the embryos vulnerable to the
potential of ever-widening scientific manipulation in the years ahead. The
embryo-as-tissue argument also forces the NIH to promulgate legal
positions, such as its controversial Rabb Memorandum," ignoring
Congress' clear intent to avoid harming living human embryos, and
sweeping behind the public's veil of ignorance the possibility that human
embryonic stem cells are totipotent-capable of generating every cell
comprising a mature human person. If totipotent, human embryonic stem
cells may not be substantially less deserving of protection than the human
embryo.
We explore each of these ideas below without imposing our view that
the human embryo is indeed a person and without discussing a mother's
moral and legal entitlement to end the life of a living human in her
womb.'12 Our point is that, regardless of your view about these important
questions, living human embryos merit more protection than those who
would gain financially and otherwise from manipulating them or simply
donating them are inclined to acknowledge. If as a society we choose now
to exclude altogether certain types of living human subjects from standard
rules of medical ethics, the utilitarian fog into which medical researchers
will travel in the years to come will surely take American medical
researchers down the darkened and dead-ended roads previously traveled
from Buchenwald ' to Tuskegee.'
4
I. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE IVF INDUSTRY AND STEM CELL RESEARCH HAVE
OUTPACED POLICYMAKING
Today's controversy concerning federal funding for human embryonic
stem cell research represents the confluence of three trends: the
11:l1 (200 1)
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maturation of the in-vitro fertilization (IVF) industry with a protocol
resulting in an exploding frozen human embryo population; the isolation
of the human embryonic stem cell within the context of promising adult
stem cell research; and policymaking that has not kept up with either. The
IVF industry sprang into existence in England in 1978.15 During the last
two decades, it has grown in the United States to 371 clinics nationally, I"
with revenues that exceed an estimated $350 million annually.17 The typical
IVF clinic supervises the creation of many more living human embryos
than are implanted because of the physical burden, medical risks, and
costs associated with egg recovery."'
Clinics find it difficult to preserve and, once preserved, successfully
fertilize oocytes."' Accordingly, within a few hours of surgically removing
oocytes, clinics fertilize the eggs and allow them to incubate.20 Successful
fertilization usually results in more embryos than women want to implant
at one time.2 The remainder are cryo-preserved and remain frozen until
the parents terminate, donate, or abandon them.22 As a result, one
observer estimated in 1999 that 150,000 frozen human embryos were in
storage with 19,000 added each year.23 Anecdotal evidence suggests the
number may be higher.
A radical, new purpose for embryo donation was foreshadowed in the
early-1980s when mouse embryonic stem cells were derived for the first
time from mouse blastocysts. 4 Soon thereafter, scientists discovered they
were totipotent.2 5 This finding "revolutionized mouse genetics. ' '26 Scientists
set about trying to duplicate the success with humans. In November 1998,
Professor James Thomson at the University of Wisconsin succeeded at
isolating human stem cells.27 This prompted President Clinton to ask the
National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) to conduct a thorough
review of the medical and ethical issues associated with human stem cell
research.8
Pursuant to the NBAC's recommendation, the NIH published its Draft
Guidelines for Research Involving Human Pluripotent Stem Cells, 29 and on
August 25, 2000, its final Guidelines (NIH Guidelines) allowing funding of
research involving human embryonic stem cells if (1) the cells were
derived without federal funds from frozen human embryos that were
created for the purposes of fertility treatment; (2) the cells were "in excess
of the clinical need" of the individuals seeking the treatment; (3) a clear
separation existed between the decision to create the embryos for fertility
treatment and the decision to donate them for research purposes; (4) no
inducements were offered for the donation of the embryos; and (5) the
informed consent of "individuals who have sought fertility treatment" was
obtained .2
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The NIH was unable to award federal money to scientists under the
NIH Guidelines because of litigation commenced on March 8, 2001,31
leading to entry of a stipulated stay pending the "outcome" of the Bush
Administration's review of the NIH Guidelines.2 The legal controversy
concerning embryonic stem cell research erupted into a vigorous political
debate in the summer of 2001. 3 It was not muted until August 9, 2001,
when President Bush decided his Administration's political solution to the
debate. 4 His closely aligned legal response leading to dismissal of the legal
action was announced on November 7, 2001."5 The Administration
withdrew portions of the NIH Guidelines inconsistent with the President's
decision to condition federally funded embryonic stem cell research on
four criteria: (1) stem cells must have been derived from an embryo with
the consent of the embryo's donors; (2) they may only have been derived
from excess embryos created for reproductive purposes at fertility clinics;
(3) the donor embryos must not have been donated in exchange for
financial inducements; and (4) all embryonic lines must have been derived
on or before August 9, 2001.6
II. THE INFORMED CONSENT MODEL IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH EMBRYONIC
RESEARCH
Both the Clinton Administration plan and Bush Administration plan
for federally funding embryonic stem cell research require the informed
consent of the living human embryo donor. 7 In essence, both plans view
(1) informed consent as equivalent to proxy consent and (2) proxy
consent as sufficient to immunize ultra-hazardous, non-therapeutic
research on living humans. As stated earlier, no court has previously
approved the latter proposition, and the former one is contradicted by the
key medical ethical codes applicable to living human subjects.
A. The Doctrine of Informed Consent Bars Embryonic Stem Cell Research
The doctrine of informed consent applicable to human subject
experimentation was essentially birthed by the Holocaust and subsequent
Doctor's Trials resulting in the Nuremberg Code.38 According to one
.commentator, American courts did not even accept the need for medical
research on human subjects until 1935. 3' The Code prohibited altogether
proxy consent for human experimentation." The Code added that consent
cannot immunize human subject experimentation unless the researcher
complies with nine other requirements, including that no a priori reason
exists to believe that death or disabling injury will occur, that the results of
the experimentation are not procurable by other means, and that
11:1 (2001)
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adequate preceding animal experimentation has taken place.41
The first systematic American effort to develop a doctrine of informed
consent applicable to federally funded human subject experimentation
incorporated the Code.42 The impact of the Code has since waned in some
respects, yet it endures as the "most complete and authoritative statement
of the law of informed consent to human experimentation.,,43 The Code's
influence on what some deem a replacement code of ethics,44 the
Declaration of Helsinki, has actually increased over time as a result of
amendments. For example, the Declaration now expressly prohibits proxy
consent to research if (1) the research is not necessary to promote the
health of the population represented; (2) the research can be performed
on legally competent individuals; and (3) the research is not based on
sufficient animal studies.'
Additionally, the Code remains "part of international common law and
may be applied, in both civil and criminal cases, by state, federal and
municipal courts in the United States."4 Although federal courts have not
found that the Code creates an implied right of action in circumstances
where adequate alternative domestic remedies exist,47 they have found,
contrary to claims of qualified immunity, a "clearly established right" to
bodily integrity in § 1983 litigation. 48 As the District of Massachusetts put it
in Heinrich v. Sweet, "[A] t the very least, the judgment of the Nuremberg
Tribunal regarding fundamental legal principles of human subject
experimentation served as an explicit international declaration that the
conduct alleged in this case 'shocked the conscience'...."49
Heinrich concerned 140 terminally ill patients under the care of the
Massachusetts General Hospital and Brookhaven National Laboratory who
were subjected to boron neutron radiation therapy without their
knowledge or consent.50 The study was deemed essential to evaluate the
potential of radioactive medical treatment.51 Heinrich relied on another
case where the University of Cincinnati College of Medicine and
Cincinnati General Hospital subjected eighty-seven African-American
cancer patients, who were terminal, indigent, and poorly educated, to
massive doses of radiation to study its effects without their informed
consent.52 Again, the scientific community considered the study critical to
prepare for nuclear war, but the Southern District of Ohio volunteered
that the complaint's allegations made out "an outrageous tale of
government perfidy in dealing with some of its most vulnerable citizens."
5
Tragically, this tale has been duplicated with minor variations in the
United States in a variety of cases involving non-therapeutic medical
research on human subjects performed for valuable reasons.54 The
objectives of human embryonic stem cell research are also unimpeachable,
5
Casey and Adams: Specially Respecting the Living Human Embryo
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2002
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
but the certain, immediate death that stem cell derivation poses for
another living human subject-the human embryo-is in many respects as
shocking as in these cases involving not proxy consent, but deception or
inadequate informed consent by generally competent adults to non-
therapeutic medical procedures with long-term medical consequences.
To understand the real impact of embryonic stem cell research on
medical ethics, add to the certain, immediate death that derivation of stem
cells causes human subjects the following additional violations of the
Nuremberg Code and Declaration of Helsinki: (1) At most a handful of
animal embryonic stem cell models exist revealing limited success at
treating the diseases targeted by human embryonic stem cell research ,5
and (2) adult human stem cell research has the potential to achieve all of
the objectives of embryonic stem cell research. 6 Thus, embryonic stem cell
research is in direct violation of the two primary medical ethical codes
governing experimentation on living human subjects.
B. Proxy Consent Has Never Been Held Sufficient to Immunize Ultra-Hazardous,
Non-Therapeutic Research on Human Subjects
Proxy consent to ultra-hazardous, non-therapeutic human research,
the additional conscious-raising concern not present in the cases explored
above, has never been held effective as a matter of law in the United States.
Two courts have approved minimally risky non-therapeutic kidney
transplants from legally incompetent human subjects to relatives,57 where
the medical institutions involved obtained judicial consent, in addition to
proxy consent, before proceeding, and the court appointed guardian ad
litems to represent the incompetent human subjects. Another court found
that it was in the best interest of a forty-three year-old incompetent donor
to undergo a bone marrow transplant involving "minimal risk" to the
donor to save his brother's life. 59 In the last case, a court implied that a
proxy could consent to her fifteen year old's decision to offer a skin graft
to his cousinY0
The few decisions involving more risky non-therapeutic
experimentation on human subjects have disapproved of proxy consent.
6
1
Two of these concerned studies on inmates,62 which if federally funded are
now prohibited.65 In one of these cases (not involving federal funding), the
New York State Office of Mental Health (OMH) promulgated regulations
with the strong support of the medical research community, which would
have permitted the administration of experimental antipsychotic and
psychotropic drugs, capable of "causing permanent harmful or even fatal
side effects." A New York appeals court held that the regulations violated
the state and federal constitutional rights to due process and a common
11:1 (2001)
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law right to personal autonomy of the patients and residents under OMH
care. 65 The Court explained:
The benefits of, and needs for, the medical research at issue are clear
and evident; but at what cost in human pain and suffering to those
subjects who are not capable of expressing either their consent or
objection to participation?..., [H]owever laudable the ends which
defendants seek to achieve may be, those results must be gained through
means within their grant of authority and which properly safeguard the
rights of the plaintiffs. It may very well be that for some categories of
greater than minimal risk non-therapeutic experiments, devised to
achieve a future benefit, there is at present no constitutionally acceptable
protocol .... 66
Maryland's highest court agreed in Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst.,
where researchers associated with Johns Hopkins University subjected
otherwise healthy children to the probability of lead poisoning to assess the
effect of various levels of lead dust abatement.6Y The Court found
inadequate disclosure of these health risks to the children's parents,68 and
added: "[I]n our view, parents whether improperly enticed by trinkets,
food stamps, money or other items, have no more right to intentionally
and unnecessarily place children in potentially hazardous non-therapeutic
research surroundings, than do researchers. In such cases, parental
consent, no matter how informed, is insufficient.
'69
The policy underlying the doctrine of informed consent to non-
therapeutic research is to preserve the autonomy, self-determination,
liberty, and equality of living human subjects, as well as to avoid fraud and
abuse.'6 Proxy consent can never achieve these purposes. The justifying
and legally immunizing role of consent depends upon the subject of the
research herself agreeing to undergo a non-therapeutic procedure after
deliberately weighing the fully disclosed risks. Consent offered by a proxy
to non-therapeutic research for his incompetent ward, no matter how well
informed, robs the patient of her autonomy and liberty and treats her as
having lesser value. Viewed in this light, proxy informed consent is a sham
and poor camouflage for mere utilitarianism:
Faced with a subject who presumably cannot consent, the Standard
Model looks for someone else's consent. This is a big jump. After all,
informed consent supposedly legitimates and justifies experimentation
because that consent protects autonomy; but how can it when someone
else is providing the consent? 'Proxy consent' is an oxymoron if consent
truly aims at protecting self-autonomy and self-determination. Through
proxy consent, the subject is labeled a morally impotent agent-less than
7
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autonomous. This is because the unspoken, but persistent, utilitarianism
which underlies so much of our thinking about experimentation requires
us to find some way to permit needed experiments while still giving lip-
service to our values.
Historically, informed consent has been deemed the most critical for
vulnerable subjects such as the imprisoned, young, and elderly. It is crucial
where the imbalance in the power relationship between the researcher and
patient is severe,72 seriously divergent interests between the researcher and
his or her subject may affect the scientist's judgment," the researcher has
more information about the consequences of the research for the subject,
74
and the subject places his or her profound trust in the investigator.
7 5
Human embryonic research is affected by all of these worst indicia of
meaningless consent. The embryo donors seek to avoid the cost of
preserving their embryos; researchers and Institutional Review Boards
(IRBs) desire federal dollars, corporate sponsorship, and prestige; and the
live human embryos themselves are, of course, incompetent and incapable
of opposition.76
Under these circumstances, we should be seriously concerned about
authorizing medical research certain to kill incompetent living human
subjects (not merely harm them as in Grimes) when the proposed benefits
of the research may yet be obtained through harmless means and
inadequate animal modeling justifies it. This type of medical research
carried to its logical conclusion threatens harm to the elderly,
handicapped, and mentally or physically ill.77 It has never been vindicated
in federal or state court, and it directly violates the Code and Declaration.'
The Grimes court indicated that certainly no parent may consent to ultra-
hazardous, non-therapeutic research affecting her child, no researcher
may consent to it because of the fiduciary-like relationship between the
researcher and his subject,79 and potentially no court may approve it.0
Indeed, it is an open question as to whether even a competent person may
consent to ultra-hazardous, non-therapeutic research on himself8 '
III. THE LMNG HUMAN EMBRYO DEMANDS SPECIAL RESPECT
Some will vigorously object that Grimes is inapplicable to living human
embryos, because embryos are not, after all, "children" in a legal sense.
The embryo in utero is not a "person" within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment,83 rendering any direct analogy to the children in
Grimes inappropriate. Notwithstanding this, even strong pro-abortion
proponents acknowledge that Roe v. Wade4 has no necessary bearing upon
the ex utero living human embryo where maternal and fetal rights are not in
11:l1(2001)
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85opposition. Professor John Robertson, for example, concedes that efforts
to limit the number of cyropreserved embryos, 6 regulate destruction of
human embryos," require their donation,8 and restrict or ban non-
therapeutic research on living human embryos"9 are constitutional.
Robertson adds, "[0] ne may reject the right-to-life position that early
embryos are themselves persons.. .and still agree that early embryos
deserve 'special respect'.....90 He acknowledges "wide consensus" favoring
this view, which he contends does not hinge on religious convictions, but
instead on the essential nature of the embryo as a living, genetically unique
human with the potential to develop into a person. 1 Courts echoing this
theme include Kass v. Kass and Davis v. Davis,93 which expressly rejected
the findings of the trial court that the embryo is a person,94 and of the
appellate court that it was mere property "no different from any other
human tissue."95 Instead, the Davis court held that living human embryos
"occupy an interim category that entitles them to special respect because of
their potential for human life.
96
The NBAC and the NIH agreed that the embryo deserves special
respect, but without influencing the choice of regulatory frameworks they
believe applicable to it. In the final analysis, they and Robertson interpret
"special respect" for the living human embryo to mean little more than
that researchers may not create embryos solely for research purposes.97 The
"informed consent" rules they believe applicable to living human embryos
are the same ones applicable to fetal tissue transplantation research,98 as if
the doctrine of informed consent ever applied to inanimate tissue. A more
intellectually honest description of this form of consent is merely "full
disclosure," since no living human subject is involved. Tissue cannot
generate anything beyond itself, whereas the human embryo is totipotent.9)
Accordingly, the fetal tissue research guidelines appear to have no
relevance to living human embryos and, even if applicable, are not truly
rules of informed consent.1°°
Embryonic stem cells are more like tissue than living human embryos,
but still not enough to complete the analogy.101 The NIH concedes that
human embryonic stem cells "can form virtually every type of cell found in
the human body."1°2 Nevertheless, the NIH has insisted that the cells are
merely pluripotent, because embryonic stem cells "are unable to give rise
to the placenta and supporting tissues necessary for development in the
human uterus."'09 The placenta and the supporting tissues come from
trophoblast cells.'0 4 Thus, in scientific terms, the NIH's claim is that human
embryonic stem cells can form all cell types, except trophoblast cells. The
scientific record refutes this. In fact, the same scientific study that the NIH
cites to demonstrate the alleged potential for human embryonic stem cell
9
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research,10 5 states that human embryonic stem cells can form trophoblast
cells.' 06
In addition, NIH Director Harold Varmus has conceded that the NIH
has never performed the necessary experiments to rule-out the possibility
that human embryonic stem cells when implanted in a woman may
congregate and give rise to a born person. °7 Animal studies using
embryonic stem cells suggest this is likely.0 8 Accordingly, some stem cell
researchers are sharing their misgivings about not admitting this to the
public. 09 By contrast, there is no chance tissue can give rise to a born
person. Therefore, embryonic stem cells deserve more protection than
mere fetal tissue regulations offer.
IV. EXISTING FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS WOULD PROHIBIT FEDERALLY
FUNDING ULTRA-HAZARDOUS, NON-THERAPEUTIC RESEARCH ON LIVING
HUMAN EMBRYOS
Existing federal and state law potentially or actually applicable to living
human embryos provide additional reason to believe that specially
respecting them requires more protection than the NIH and others
acknowledge. Subparts A and B of the Federal Human Subjects Policy may
be interpreted to ban embryonic stem cell research altogether, and the
Dickey Amendment may be interpreted to ban research on living human
embryos. State laws affecting living human embryos establish tort liability
for damages to the unborn and restrict or ban research on embryos and
authorize their adoption. We explore these rules below.
A. If Applicable, Federal Human Subjects Policy, Subparts A and B, Prohibit
Federally Funding Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research
The springboard for Grimes' finding that researchers owe quasi-
fiduciary obligations to human subjects was, in addition to the Nuremberg
Code, the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, including
Subpart A and Subpart B (Human Subjects Policy). 0 Subpart A states it is
applicable "to all research involving human subjects conducted, supported,
or otherwise subject to regulation by any federal epart .... Human
subjects are defined as "living individual[s] about whom an
investigator.. .conducting research obtains (1) data through intervention
or interaction with the individual, or (2) identifiable private
information.',1 2 This definition does not reference a legal juridical person.
Under Subpart A, the informed consent requirement states: "[N]o
investigator may involve a human being as a subject in research covered by
this policy unless the investigator has obtained the legally effective informed
11:1 (2001)
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consent of the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative."" 3
The rule does not make clear whether, by "human being," someone or
something other than a "human subject" was intended; however, it defines
as an element of necessary consent, "a statement that the particular
treatment or procedure may involve risks to the subject (or to the embryo or
fetus, if the subject is or may become pregnant) which are currently
unforeseeable."
' 4
Accordingly, Subpart A does not state that its application is limited to
living human persons and leaves open the possibility that a living human
embryo is a "human being," which may be equivalent to a "human subject"
and, therefore, regulated. A leading definition of human subject
experimentation outside of the federal regulatory framework supports this
view: Human subject experimentation is "any manipulation, observation,
or other study of a human being-or of anything related to that human being
that might subsequently result in manipulation of that human being-
done with the intent of developing new knowledge and which differs in
any form from customary medical (or other professional practice) .".. The
counterargument is that an "individual" frequently is a natural person, and
the "human being" referenced in Subpart A's rules of informed consent
may not be more expansive than its definition of "human subject." In
rebuttal, the NIH itself has implied that human embryos are individuals.'1 6
The informed consent rule of Subpart A implies that some proxy
consent may not be legally effective, a fact the Grimes court emphasized in
calling for prior judicial (not mere IRB) review before implementing non-
therapeutic research on a human subject."7 The court opined, "[s]cience
cannot be permitted to be the sole judge of the appropriateness of such
research methods on human subjects .... ...s Likewise, in the single other
reported instance of non-therapeutic experimentation posing a greater
than minimal risk to the living human subject, a New York appeals court
found that proxy consent would be ineffective under state law." 9
Subpart B of the Human Subjects Policy, considered by some more
relevant to human embryonic research than Subpart A,12 "applies to all
research involving pregnant women or human fetuses, and to all research
involving the in vitro fertilization of human ova, conducted or supported by"
HHS. 12 ' The definition of IVF is "any fertilization of human ova which
occurs outside the body of a female, either through admixture of donor
human sperm and ova or by any other means." 22 Subpart B incorporates
all of Subpart A's obligations and calls for additional IRB duties. 23 The
NIH and others resist an interpretation of IVF within the meaning of
Subpart B incorporating extra-corporeal embryo research. 2 4 The NIH
believes the embryo is only protected under the Human Subjects Policy if it
11
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is in utero."5 Regardless, it is clear that the human embryo, which is the
subject of the Clinton and Bush plans for stem cell research, may only
come from IVF, and that Subpart B applies to "all research involving... in
vitro fertilization.'
26
If the Human Subjects Policy is thus applicable to human embryos, we
must decide whether proxies can provide legally effective consent to ultra-
hazardous, non-therapeutic derivation of stem cells from living human
embryos. In addition, we must evaluate whether this derivation is
necessarily related to research utilizing those stem cells. Subpart A (which
is incorporated in Subpart B) requires that IRBs ensure that risks to
human subjects are minimized and reasonable in relation to anticipated
benefits.
12 7
"Minimal risk" means that the probability and magnitude of harm or
discomfort anticipated in the research may not be "greater in and of
themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the
performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests.',
2 8
In addition, IRBs must incorporate additional safeguards for subjects
vulnerable to coercion.1 29 Thus, to the extent derivation of stem cells is
inherently related to their use, Subpart A would prevent federally funding
embryonic stem cell research.
B. The Dickey Amendment Protects the Living Human Embryo From Any Federally
Funded Procedure Posing More Than Minimal Risk to It
Concededly, it may be argued that the Human Subjects Policy does not
regulate research on living human embryos. The so-called Dickey
Amendment defines "human embryo" as "any organism, not protected as a
human subject under the Human Subjects Policy as of the date of the
enactment of this Act, that is derived by fertilization, parthenogenesis,
cloning, or any other means from one or more human gametes or human
diploid cells. ,130 Accordingly, the NIH believes that we must derive our
hermeneutic of special respect for the human embryo from a
memorandum issued on January 15, 1999, by HHS General Counsel
Harriet S. Rabb, interpreting the Dickey Amendment (Rabb
memorandum).1'
The Dickey Amendment, included in every HHS appropriations bill
since 1995,132 states: "None of the funds made available by this Act may be
used for...research in which a human embryo or embryos are destroyed,
discarded or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death greater than
that allowed for research on fetuses in utero.... "' Interpreting this
language, the Rabb memorandum claimed that the Dickey Amendment
bans federal funding of the derivation of embryonic stem cells-a
11:l1 (200 1)
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euphemism for the procedure that kills the living human embryo-but not
research utilizing the derived embryonic stem cells.
13 4
This interpretation flatly contradicted legislative history through 2001,
and the original purpose for passing the Dickey Amendment-to prevent
embryonic research.' 35 Until 1994, a defacto federal ban on human embryo
research existed. 36 The Clinton Administration took steps to reverse this
ban pursuant to the recommendation of an ad hoc advisory committee, the
Human Embryo Research Panel (HERP) ,'3 while still prohibiting the
creation of embryos for research purposes.138 In testimony before the
House Appropriations Committee, NIH Director Varmus stated that he
"firmly agree [d]" with several portions of the HERP report, and told the
Committee that the NIH was currently deciding whether to go forward
with funding.
3 9
Before the NIH could approve any grants, Congress passed the Dickey
Amendment for the first time. 40 Opponents of the amendment objected to
it on the grounds that it would foreclose action on the HERP report and
"segregate [human embryo] research into private laboratories, which are
not subject to any set scientific or ethical guidelines.' 4' Senator Boxer
agreed that the Dickey Amendment amounted to "a total prohibition of
Federal funding for human embryo research." 42 That first year, the House
Appropriations Committee rejected an alternative rider offered by
Representative John Porter, which would have codified President Clinton's
directive by prohibiting only the funding of the creation of embryos for
research purposes.143
During the 1997 reauthorization cycle, the full House roundly rejected
an amendment offered by Representative Lowey and identical to the
Porter Amendment.' 44 Again, the proponents and opponents of embryo
research operated on the same premise (i.e., that the Dickey Amendment
banned federal funding of all research dependent upon the destruction of
an embryo). 45 Porter argued, for example, that repeal of the Dickey
Amendment was necessary because federal funding of research "could also
lead to breakthroughs in the use of embryonic stem cells." 46 No further
attempts were made to modify the Dickey Amendment until the 2001
reauthorization cycle. Therefore, the conclusion is inescapable that the
Rabb memorandum, NIH Guidelines, and even the proposed Bush plan
proposing funding on sixty stem cell lines necessarily derived through the
termination of human embryos were inconsistent with the Dickey
Amendment as passed from 1995 to 2000.1
4 7
In 2001, the Senate was widely expected to modify the Dickey
Amendment; however, the national tragedy of September 11 changed the
political landscape. The House reauthorized the Amendment without
13
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change, but interpreted its action as consistent with the proposed Bush
plan.14 Representative McDermott and Senator Arlen Specter proposed
amendments permitting liberal embryonic stem cell research.4 9 Both
failed. The resulting Amendment is not a vindication of the Rabb
memorandum's derivation-versus-use dichotomy.5 ° Nor is it a vindication
of the limited protection that President Clinton; Representatives Lowey,
Porter, and McDermott; and Senator Specter offered (i.e., prohibiting the
funding merely of the creation of embryos for research purposes).
Rather, the resulting Amendment is a vindication of the principles
permitting research on already dead fetuses. President Bush refused to
justify research on living human embryos based on the derivation-versus-
use dichotomy; he authorized research only on embryos terminated before
August 9, 2001, without creating federal incentives to kill more."'
Accordingly, the "special respect" Congress and the President wish to
accord living human embryos is best understood as security from any
procedure that would pose more than minimal risk to them, including use-
inspired derivation of stem cells.
C. State Regulations Affecting Living Human Embryos Limit or Ban Embryonic
Research, Permit Adoption, and Create Tort Liability
Likewise, the special respect that state law affords living human
embryos resembles more closely human subjects than dead fetuses or
human tissue. Thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia have
recognized expressly or implicitly by statute, resolution, and/or court
decision that "fertilization" and "conception" initiates the life of a human
being. 52 In many of these states, courts impose tort liability for damages to
the unborn without regard (for purposes of standing) to the viability of the
child at the time of injury.5 3 Ten states expressly regulate human
embryonic research; seven of these states permit only therapeutic human
embryonic research.154 Three additional states tried to regulate human
embryonic research, but their regulations were overbroad. 55 Two states
have enacted a rudimentary legal framework for human embryo
adoption,5 6 a concept ordinarily not applied to mere tissue or dead human
subjects.
V. A PERMANENT LEGAL COMPROMISE No WEAKER THAN THE BUSH
PROPOSAL IS URGENTLY NEEDED
In the final analysis, the nascent federal and state legal regime
applicable to human embryos reflects the objective reality that they are
living members of the human species, not merely inanimate tissue.
11:1 (2001)
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Although not yet judicially recognized as persons within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the legal regime treats them as juridical
quasi-persons with some of the rights of incompetent living persons. A
permanent legal compromise is necessary to protect these quasi-persons
against ever-widening scientific manipulation threatened by proponents of
broader federal funding for embryonic stem cell research and to prevent
further erosion of the standard human subject experimentation rules.'
57
We would have preferred to prevent any embryonic stem cell
research.'58 The policies informing the case law and legislative intent
explored above, that we believe strongly militate in favor of rendering
standard human subject experimentation rules applicable to embryos,
include (1) all other living humans-even the least desirable criminals-
are specially protected; (2) treating any living human as expendable
impacts all by lowering the ethical bar; (3) derivation of stem cells is
immediately terminal for the embryo and unlikely to have any therapeutic
impact on embryos as a class in the near future; (4) proxy consent can
never achieve the objects of informed consent, including autonomy, self-
determination, liberty, and equality; (5) those urging, monitoring, and
even offering proxy consent for derivation of stem cells have much to gain
from it; and (6) scientists have not satisfied their burden of proving that
(a) embryonic stem cell research is likely to prove successful; (b) its
speculative objectives cannot be secured through other means; and (c)
embryonic stem cells are merely pluripotent.
If embryonic stem cells are merely pluripotent, stem cell lines
extracted without the legally effective informed consent of their donors
would still be illegal. 159 If totipotent, embryonic stem cells may also be
subject to the Dickey Amendment, because they qualify as "human
embryos" within the meaning of the Amendment as interpreted by the
NIH. That is, the Dickey Amendment defines "human embryo" as "any
organism... that is derived by fertilization, parthenogenesis, cloning, or any
other means from one or more human gametes or human diploid cells." '60
Although the Amendment does not define "organism," the NIH contends
that it means "an individual constituted to carry out all life functions." 61 By
definition, a totipotent cell is capable of developing into a mature
individual if nurtured in the right environment and, thus, able to carry out
all life functions. '6 Under these circumstances, the Dickey Amendment
would prohibit research posing more than minimal risk to embryonic stem
cells-a fact Congress has so far not considered probably because the NIH
has swept under the rug the potential totipotency of human embryonic
stem cells.
Nevertheless, the advantage of permanently legislating the proposed
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Bush plan over the Clinton plan is that the former offers a meaningful
interim category between the embryo-as-tissue and embryo-as-person
regulatory framework. The idea of federally funding research on a limited
number of already terminated human embryos while permitting states to
ban it altogether, puts some flesh on the special respect most Americans
believe is due the living human embryo. Space prevents us from
expounding on a proposed Subpart E (Additional Protections for Human
Embryos), and the additional legislation we believe necessary to accord
meaningful special respect to the living human embryo. Suffice it to say
that we believe the Human Subjects Policy must carefully distinguish the
various forms of consent and disclosure, removing any possibility that
proxies may give their consent to ultra-hazardous, non-therapeutic
research on living humans, except as permitted in our proposed revised
permanent Dickey Amendment. 63 Furthermore, Subpart E should
generally permit research posing no more than a minimal risk to living
human embryos. Finally, federal or state laws should ban creation of
human embryos for research purposes,'6 ban cloning,'6 limit the number
of human embryos that may be cyropreserved in the IVF treatment
process,' 66 regulate the disposition of living and frozen human embryos, 67
and encourage embryo adoption over donation. In this manner, we can
ensure special respect for the living human embryo.
11:1 (2001)
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Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996) (making this point with regard to
New York state surrogacy regulations).
59. Matter of Doe, 481 N.Y.S.2d 932
(N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (per curiam).
60. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121
(App. D.C. 1941) (finding that guardian
(aunt) consent was necessary for a fifteen-
year-old to give a skin graft to a badly
burned cousin; appellate court did not
state that parental consent was sufficient
for non-therapeutic research).
61. See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst.,
782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001); T.D. v. New York
State Office of Mental Health, 626 N.Y.S.2d
1015 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), affd, 650
N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (finding
that a state agency could not authorize
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non-therapeutic experiments on mental
patients including both adult and minor
subjects).
62. T.D., 650 N.Y.S.2d at 176;
Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental
Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct.
Wayne County, Mich.July 10, 1973).
63. See Federal Policy for the Protection
of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. 46, Subpart
C.
64. T.D., 626 N.Y.S.2d at 177-78, 184
(noting that the medical community
supports research guidelines and that
research is not federally funded).
65. Id. at 176.
66. Id. at 177.
67. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst.,
782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Richard Delgado & Helen
Leskovac, Informed Consent in Human
Experimentation: Bridging the Gap Between
Ethical Thought and Current Practice, 34
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 67, 78, 124-25 (1986);
Garnett, supra note 44, at 457; Morin, supra
note 39, at 165, 177, 210 (citing Robert
Levine, The Nature and Definition of Informed
Consent in Various Research Settings, in
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,
THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES
AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (1979)
[hereinafter BELMONT REPORT]).
71. Garnett, supra note 44, at 486.
72. Id. at 477-81 (citing 45 C.F.R. §§
46.304-.305; 306(a) (2) (i-iii) (1994)
(limiting the scope of prisoner research
eligible for federal funding,
notwithstanding that prisons are ideal
places for behavioral research); Kaimowitz
v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, Civil
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No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County,
Mich. July 10, 1973) (holding that
psychosurgery could not be undertaken





76. See Delgado & Leskovac, supra note
70, at 91-107 (noting that the interests of
the patient and scientists are sharply
opposed in the experimental setting);
Feiler, supra note 12, at 2452 (noting that
research embryos are more vulnerable than
minor children and, therefore, should be
protected after the potential harm to them
is weighed against public detriment and
researcher's interests); Carl Elliott, Pharma
Buys a Conscience, 12 AM. PROSPECT, Sept.
24, 2001 (concerning the remarkable
extent to which bioethicists and the
medical community have permitted private
corporate dollars to influence their
research and judgment).
77. Feiler, supra note 12, at 2453.
78. Ultra-hazardous, non-therapeutic
research on incompetent living humans
also violates the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of
the Human Being With Regard to the
Application of Biology and Medicine:
Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine, Apr. 4, 1997, Council on
Europe, art. 6(1), 17(2), ETS No. 164
[hereinafter Convention on Human Rights
and Biomedicine].
79. Id. at 85.
80. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst.,
782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001) (citing 626
N.Y.S.2d 1015 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (finding
that a state agency could not authorize
non-therapeutic experiments on mental
patients including both adult and minor
subjects)).
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81. Id. At some point, a risky non-
therapeutic procedure could be deemed
suicide.
82. Embryos are children only in the
genetic sense that they are a result of
fertilization of the parents' gametes and
pragmatic sense that they are their parents'
wards. The born human embryo is
presumed the child of the birth mother. See
Opportunities and Advancements Hearing,
supra note 21, at n.16 and accompanying
text (statement of JoAnn L. Davidson); see
also In re O.G.M, 988 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1999) (finding that a male gametes
provider was entitled to a grant of paternity
in relation to a child born through IVF
from a frozen pre-embryo conceived
during marriage, but implanted in his
former wife after divorce).
83. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 413 (1973).
84. Roe, 410 U.S. at 413.
85. Robertson II, supra note 2, at 499
("The constitutionality of state laws that
seek to prevent the discard or destruction
of IVF embryos does not depend on
whether Roe v. Wade is reversed."); Parker,
supra note 12, at 786-87. But see Doe v.
Shalala, 862 F. Supp. 1421 (D. Md. 1994)
("The Court sees no distinction between
fetuses in utero or ex utero.")
86. Robertson II, supra note 2.
87. Id. at 487.
88. Id. at 499.
89. Id. at 504-06.
90. Robertson II, supra note 2, at 446-
47; see also Robertson I, supra note 2, at 972-
75.
91. Robertson II, supra note 2, at 515.
92. 1995 WL 110368, at *4 (N.Y. Sup.
Jan. 18, 1995) (unpublished), rev'd on other
grounds, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1997)
(failing to reconsider trial court's
endorsement of the view that embryos are
more than property but less than persons).
93. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert.
denied sub nom., Stowe v. Davis, 507 U.S. 911
(1993) (citing The American Fertility
Society approving this position).
94. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989
WL 140495, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989),
rev'd, 1990 WL 130807 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1990) (unpublished), affd, 842 S.W.2d 588
(Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub nom., Stowe v.
Davis, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
95. Davis, 1990 WL 130807.
96. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597. But see
York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va.
1989) (treating the embryo as property).
97. Robertson I, supra note 2, at 782-83.
98. NIH Guidelines, supra note 7
(referencing 42 U.S.C. § 28 9g-1); Parker,
supra note 12, at 781 (citing NAT'T.
BIoETHICs ADVISORY COMM'N, ETHICAL
ISSUES IN HUMAN STEM CELL RESEARCH 50
(1999)).
99. Robertson II, supra note 2, at 510. It
should be added that 21 C.F.R. § 1270.3
defines "banked human tissue" as "any
tissue derived from a human body, which
(1) is intended for transplantation to
another human for the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of any
condition or disease; (2) is recovered,
processed, stored, or distributed by
methods that do not change tissue function
or characteristics; (3) is not currently
regulated as a human drug, biological
product, or medical device; (4) excludes
kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas, or any
other vascularized human organ; and (5)
excludes semen or other reproductive
tissue, human milk, and bone marrow."
100. See also Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596
(finding that the Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act, which governs fetal tissue, was "not
precisely controlling" in relation to the
human embryo).
101. See also Simkins v. Nevadacare, 229
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F.3d 729, 735 (9th Cir. 2000) ("We believe
the average person would not.. understand
stem cells to be 'tissue."').
102. PRIMER, supra note 56.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Draft National Institutes of
Health Guidelines for Research Involving
Human Pluripotent Stem Cells, 64 Fed.
Reg. 67,576 (1999) (citing James A.
Thomson et al., Embryonic Stem Cell Lines
Derived from Human Blastocysts, 282 SCI. 1145
(1998)).
106. Thomson, supra note 105, at 1145
("After undifferentiated proliferation in
vitro for 4 to 5 months, these cells still
maintained the developmental potential to
form trophoblast and derivatives of all
three embryonic germ layers....").
107. Ironically, Varmus insists that the
investigation itself would be unethical. Stem
Cell Hearing, supra note 33. ("It is true that
sometimes these cells can aggregate and
may appear like one of the early phases in
the development of a normal embryo. But
to my mind nothing would be less ethical
than to attempt to ascertain whether or not
this was indeed a precursor to an organism,
a viable embryo....").
108. Mice studies prove that mice
embryonic stem cells when implanted in
the female give rise to a born mouse with
the genetic make-up of the embryonic stem
cells. See Andrfs Nagy et al., Derivation of
Completely Cell Culture-Derived Mice from Early-
Passage Embryonic Stem Cells, 90 PROC. NAT'L
ACAD. SCI. 8424 (1993). Experiments with
cattle indicate that these results are not
limited to mice. See Shizue Iwasaki et al.,
Production of Live Calves Derived from
Embryonic Stem-Like Cells Aggregated with
Tetraploid Embryos, 62 BIOLOGY REP. 470
(2000) (finding that the implantation of
cattle embryonic stem cells into a host
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leads to the birth of live cattle).
109. Nelle S. Paegel, Note, Use of Stem
Cells in Biotechnological Research, 22
WHITTIER L. REV. 1183, 1188, 1190, 1203
(2001). Dr. Lee Silver, a mouse geneticist at
Princeton University, has stated that,
whereas he favors human embryonic stem
cell research, "he is offended by the
winking and nodding of scientists who do
not want to admit the potential of the cells
to become babies." Id. at 1203. Nagy, who
created born mice from stem cells, added:
"I don't think there's a theoretical or
practical impossibility of creating a
completely stem-cell derived human being,
if one wanted to do that." Id. See also DIANE
T. DUFFY, BACKGROUND AND LEGAL ISSUES
RELATED TO STEM CELL RESEARCH 2 (Oct. 9,
2001) (CRS Report No. RS21044) (on file
with authors) ("The earliest embryonic
stem cells are called totipotent cells.").
110. Id.
111. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2001)
(emphasis added).
112. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f) (2001)
(emphasis added).
113. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2001)
(emphasis added).
114. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(1) (2001)
(emphasis added).
115. Robert Levine, The Boundaries
Between Biomedical or Behavioral Research and
Accepted and Routine Practice of Medicine, in 1
THE BELMONT REPORT, 1-6 (Nat'l Comm'n
for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research ed.,
1979).
116. Cf 45 C.F.R. § 46.402(a) (2001)
("'Children' are persons...."). According to
the Rabb memorandum, human stem cells
do not qualify as "organisms" within the
meaning of the term "embryo," as defined
by the Dickey Amendment, because they
are not "individual[s] constituted to carry
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out all life functions." Rabb memorandum,
infra note 131, at 2. The necessary
implication is that, by contrast, living
human embryos are individuals able to
carry out all life functions.
117. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst.,
782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001).
118. Id.
119. T.D. v. N.Y. State Office of Mental
Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173, 185, 192 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1996). The New York Court of
Appeals did not pass on the question of
whether proxy consent of a child
committed to a mental institution would
have satisfied 28 C.F.R. Subpart D. Id. at
192.
120. Gross, supra note 4, at 862 (Subpart
B is more on point, but "still fails to
adequately address the complex issues
raised by embryonic stem cell research.").
121. 45 C.F.R. § 46.201(a) (2001)
(emphasis added).
122. 45 C.F.R. § 46.202(c) (2001).
123. 45 C.F.R. § 46.203 (2001).
124. Nat'l Inst. Health, Notice of
Meeting of Panel, 59 Fed. Reg. 45,293,
45,293 (1994) [hereinafter Meeting of
Panel] ("The Panel's charge encompasses
only research involving the extracorporeal
human embryo produced by in vitro
fertilization, i.e., in the test tube, or
parthenogenesis.... Research involving in
utero human embryos or fetuses is not part
of the Panel's mandate. Guidelines for
such research are embodied in.. .45 C.F.R.
Part 46...."); Gross, supra note 4, at 862
("Research on isolated stem cell lines,
involving neither human sperm nor egg
cells, does not meet the definition of IVF
research.").
125. Meeting of Panel, supra note 124, at
45,293.
126. 45 C.F.R. § 46.201(a) (2001)
(emphasis added). Notably, if the rest of
Aldous Huxley's prophecy becomes reality
in the future, the totipotent living human
embryo at an IVF clinic could be deemed
an ex utero "fetus" subject to Subpart B. 45
C.F.R. § 46.209. Section 46.209 expressly
addressed "activities directed toward
fetuses ex utero, including nonviable fetuses,
as subjects." Yet the definition of "fetus" in
Section 46.202 is "the product of
conception from implantation until a
determination is made after delivery that it
is viable" (emphasis added). The embryo
which is the subject of human stem cell
research has not been and will not be
implanted and, thus, cannot currently
qualify as a fetus. On the other hand,
fetuses ex utero (more advanced than
embryos) may theoretically exist in the
future without implantation, rendering the
definition of fetus in Section 46.202
unhelpful.
127. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (a) (2001).
128. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i) (2001).
129. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(b) (2001). For
children, Subpart D of the Human Subjects
Policy makes clear that federal funds can
be expended on non-therapeutic research
involving no more than "a minor increase
over minimal risk." 45 C.F.R. §
46.406(a) (b) (2001). Additionally, 45
C.F.R. § 46.408 (2001) requires that IRBs
solicit the assent of children to the
research, unless the children are simply too
young to give it and the intervention holds
out a prospect of direct benefit to the
children.
130. Consolidated Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 510(b) (emphasis
added).
131. Memorandum from Harriet S.
Rabb, General Counsel, U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, to Harold
Varmus, Director, National Institutes of
Health (]an. 15, 1999) (on file with
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132. See Balanced Budget Downpayment
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99, 110 Stat. 26, 34,
Title I, § 128 (Jan. 26, 1996); Omnibus Bill,
Pub. L. No. 104-208 § 512 (Sept. 30, 1996);
Labor/HHS/Education Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-78 § 513 (Nov. 13,
1997); Omnibus Bill, Pub. L. No. 105-277 §
511 (Oct. 21, 1998); Omnibus Bill, Pub. L.
No. 106-113 § 510 (Nov. 29, 1999);
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act
of 2001, Pub L. No. 106-554 § 510 (Dec. 21,
2000).
133. Citing 45 C.F.R. § 46.208(a) (2) and
section 489(b) of the Public Health Service
Act (42 U.S.C. § 289g(b) (the risk standard
for fetuses intended to be aborted and
fetuses intended to be carried to term)).
134. See 65 Fed. Reg. 51976. The Rabb
memorandum and, thus, the NIH
Guidelines also stated that human
embryonic stem cells are not "human
embryos," as defined by the Dickey
Amendment, on the grounds that they "are
not organisms and do not have the capacity
to develop into an organism that could
perform all the life functions of a human
being-in this sense they are not even
precursors to human organisms." Id.
135. The authors wish to acknowledge
the contribution of Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP to this analysis of legislative
history, which is partially reflected in the
complaint that Human Life Advocates and
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher crafted in
Nightlight Christian Adoptions v.
Thompson, Civil Action No. 1.01CV00502-
RCL, U.S. District Court, District of
Columbia (March 8, 2001).
136. Although federal funding for IVF
research projects was permissible, it
required the approval of an Ethical
Advisory Board (EAB). 45 C.F.R. §
46.204(d), nullified by section 121(c) of
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the NIH Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub. L.
No. 103-43, 107 Stat. 122 (June 10, 1993).
HHS declined to direct an EAB to perform
any funding review of a proposed IVF
research project until September 1978.
That board concluded that certain funding
was theoretically ethical, but the NIH
declined to take any action on this
conclusion. In early 1993, the Clinton
Administration proposed, and Congress
subsequently passed, legislation intended
to eliminate the EAB approval prerequisite,
as well as the executive moratorium on
fetal tissue research. Id
137. NAT'L INST. HEALTH, I REPORT OF
THE HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH PANEL 49
(1994); see alsoid. at xvii, 2, 8, 26-27, 47, 49,
50, 76 (recommending federal funding for
human embryonic stem cell research using
"spare" embryos from IVF clinics).
138. 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2459
(Dec. 2, 1994) (on file with author).
139. Dep't of Labor, Health & Human
Servs., Educ., and Related Agencies
Appropriations for 1996: Hearings Before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Appropriations, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 139,
144 (1995); see also NAT'L INST. HEALTH,
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE IMPACT
OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH
AMENDMENT 2 (1996) (The NIH would
have funded six out of nine applications for
grants involving embryo-related research "if
the NIH had been able to proceed
according to the [Human Embryo
Research Panel's] recommendations and
the President's directive.").
140. H.R. REP. No. 104-209, at 384
(1996) (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 385.
142. 142 CONG. REC. S429, S433 (1996)
(emphasis added).
143. H.R. REP. No. 104-209, at 213-14
(1995).
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144. Id. at H7364; 142 CONG. REC.
H7339 (July 11, 1996).
145. Id. at H7339-43.
146. Id. at H7340 (emphasis added).
147. In a letter dated February 11, 1999,
approximately seventy-five members of
Congress requested that then-Secretary
Shalala correct the HHS General Counsel's
misinterpretation of the Dickey
Amendment (on file with author). Paul
Recer, Work Using Fetal Cells Draws Fire,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 18, 1999, at AIO
(seventy Congressmen). On February 12,
1999, seven U.S. Senators added their
disapproval (letter on file with author).
The authors' review of the administrative
record shows that the NIH received
approximately 50,000 comments on the
Draft Guidelines from members of
Congress, patient advocacy groups,
scientific societies, religious organizations,
and private citizens, the majority of which
were opposed.
148. The House report language states,
"The committee continues a provision to
prohibit the use of funds in the Act
concerning research involving human
embryos. However, this language should
not be construed to limit federal support
for research involving human embryonic
stem cells listed on an NIH registry and
carried out in accordance with policy
outlined by the President." H.R. REP. No.
107-229, § 510 (2001). See also Azar
memorandum, supra note 35.
149. H.R. 2059, 107th Cong. (2001)
(killed in committee); S. 723, 107th Cong.
(2001) (killed in committee); S. 1536,
107th Cong. § 510 (2001) (adding to the
Dickey Amendment part (c): "Federal
dollars are permitted, at the discretion of
the President, solely for the purpose of
stem cell research, on embryos that have
been created in excess of clinical need and
will be discarded, and donated with the
written consent of the progenitors.")
150. Departments of Labor, Health and
Human Services, and Education, and
Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-116 (Jan. 10, 2002).
151. Azar memorandum, supra note 35.
152. See Opportunities and Advancements
Hearing, supra note 21, at n.19 (statement
ofJoAnn L. Davidson).
153. Parker, supra note 12, at 789.
154. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.0111(6)
(West 2001) (prohibiting all research
except that which preserves the life or
health of the fetus); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:122 (West 2001) (banning all research on
embryos and prohibiting the cultivation of
embryos for the same); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (West 2001)
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ANN. Laws ch. 112, § 12J (Law. Co-op.
2001) (regulating the use of a live
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experimentation thereupon); MICH. COMP.
LAwS ANN. § 333.2685 (West 2001)
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embryos, if that research substantially
jeopardizes the embryo's life or health or if
the embryo is the subject of a planned
abortion); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422
(West 2000) (banning all use of a
conceptus in scientific research except
where it is "harmless" to the conceptus);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:15 (2000)
(limiting the maintenance of non-frozen
pre-embryos ex utero to fourteen days and
prohibiting the transfer of a research pre-
embryo to a uterine cavity); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-02.2-01 (2001) (criminalizing
the use of a fetus in experimentation
except where the purpose is to
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11:1 (2001)
28
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 2 [2002], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol2/iss1/6
ANN. § 3216 (West 2001) (criminalizing all
non-therapeutic research on the
conceptus); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-54-1
(2001) (prohibiting experimentation on all
living embryos except as necessary for the
life or health of the mother).
155. Forbes v. Napolitano, 236 F.3d 1009
(9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 903 (9th
Cir. 2000) (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36-2302);Jane
L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir.
1995), rev'd on other grounds sub nom, Leavitt
v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137 (1996)
(overturning UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310
("Live unborn children may not be used
for experimentation ....")); Lifchez v.
Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (overturning 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. §
510/6(7)); See also Robertson II, supra note
2, at 503 (noting that at least twenty states
have laws restricting fetal research and that,
"[iun many instances the statutes are drawn
so broadly that they would apply to embryo
research as well."). See, e.g.,.MO. REv. STAT.
§ 188.037 (2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-
1 to 7 (Michie 2001); S.D. CODIED LAws
§§ 34-14-16, 34-14-17 (Michie 2001); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-7-31 (2001) ("Selling,
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unborn children is prohibited.").
156. FLA. STAT. ANN §§ 63.212(i)(2)
(West 2001) provides that individuals may
enter into a pre-planned adoption
agreement wherein the mother agrees to
become pregnant through "fertility
techniques" including embryo adoption.
The agreement must be reviewed and
approved by a court of law to effect a final
adoption. Id. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:126
(West 2001) requires 'adoptive
implantation" of embryos when the
creators of the embryos are unidentifiable
or no longer want the embryos. Embryo
adoption is fulfilled when the couple
"executes the notarial act of adoption of
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ANN. § 9:130 (West 2000). See also OL.
STAT. tit. 10 § 556 (2001) (written consent
of husband and wife desiring to receive and
donate an embryo is necessary; the former
statute also requires consent from a
physician and any judge of a court having
adoption jurisdiction in the state); TEx.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.103 (West 2001)
(written consent necessary of husband and
wife desiring to receive embryo and of
husband and wife desiring to donate
embryo).
157. The compromise should not be
merely administrative, because of the
NIH's inherent conflict of interest as the
regulatory agency enforcing the Human
Subjects Policy. "On one hand, it will be
overseeing oversight to ensure the fund
recipients are following the guidelines. On
the other hand, it's own scientists will be
among those receiving the federal funds
and competing in the marketplace with
their results." Paegel, supra note 109, at
1198-99.
158. It makes little sense to us
philosophically and theologically to treat
any developmental stage of the human as
less valuable than another or to distinguish
the respect accorded the living human
depending on its location within, partially
outside, or completely outside the womb.
159. Some have argued that stem cells
taken from living human embryos without
the legally effective consent of their donors
is to eat fruit of the poisonous tree. Of
course, fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine
stems from the Fourth Amendment and is
applicable to embryonic stem cell research
only by analogy. See Fourth Amendment
Rights; Fruit of Poisonous Tree Doctrine, 29A
AM.JUR. 2D Evidence § 752 (1994).
160. Consolidated Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 510(b) (emphasis
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161. Rabb memorandum, supra note
131, at 2.
162. Accord DUFFY, supra note 109, at 2
("The earliest embryonic stem cells.. .can
develop into an entire organism,
producing both the embryo and tissues
required to support it in the uterus.").
163. Proposed revised permanent
Dickey Amendment incorporating Bush
Proposal: (a) None of the funds made
available by this Act may be used for-(1)
the creation of a human embryo or
embryos for research purposes; (2)
research in which a human embryo or
embryos are destroyed, discarded, or
knowingly subjected to risk of injury or
death greater than that allowed for
research on fetuses in utero under 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.208(a)(2) and section 489(b) of the
Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C.
§289g(b)); or (3) research that directly or
indirectly involves or relates to [any cell or
combination of cells derived directly or
indirectly from] any cell line derived or
obtained in any manner in which a human
embryo or embryos were destroyed,
discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of
injury or death greater than that allowed
for research on fetuses in utero under 45
C.F.R. § 46.208(a) (2) and section 489(b) of
the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C.
§289g(b)); or that necessitates, entails, or
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or injury to a human embryo [including
without limitation any research involving or
relating to any cell or tissue directly or
indirectly obtained from or produced by
any such cell line] except to the extent that
such cell line was derived entirely (A) on or
before August 9, 2001, (B) with the consent
of the embryo's donors after full disclosure
of the consequences of cell derivation, (C)
from an embryo that was created solely for
reproductive purposes at a fertility clinic
but subsequently deemed by the embryo's
donors to be in excess of need, and (D)
from an embryo that was donated for
research purposes without the payment of
any financial or other consideration to or
on behalf of any donor or fertility clinic.
(b) "Human embryo" is any organism that
is derived by fertilization, parthenogenesis,
cloning, or any other means from one or
more human gametes or human diploid
cells.
164. See European Council, Convention
on Human Rights and Biomedicine Art.
18(2); Feiler, supra note 12, at 2466.
165. See Human Cloning Prohibition Act
of 2001, H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. § 302
(2001); European Council, Additional
Protocol to the Convention on Human
Rights and Biomedicine, on the
Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings Art.
1 (1998).
166. Concerning the embryo
cyropreservation practice, see Opportunities
and Advancements Hearing, supra note 21, at
n.9 and accompanying text (statement of
JoAnn L. Davidson). Robertson has argued,
"IVF and freezing create and protect
embryos; they do not destroy them."
Robertson II, supra note 2, at 493. But the
evidence suggests otherwise. Conservatively,
50% of the frozen human embryos perish
in the cyropreservation and thawing
process when one or more of their cells
suffer cyroinjury. See Opportunities and
Advancements Hearing, supra note 21, at n.17
and accompanying text (statement of
JoAnn L. Davidson).
167. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:130
(West 1991) (no embryo may be
intentionally destroyed, and if IVF patients
renounce their parental rights, the embryo
shall be available for adoptive
implantation); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
11:1 (2001)
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311.715 (Michie 1995) (public medical
facility's intentional destruction of embryos
shall be illegal). Robertson admits that IVF
clinics are discarding embryos. See
Robertson I, supra note 2, at 977 ("To avoid
controversy with right-to-life groups and
gain hospital approval, most American IVF
programs claim to transfer all fertilized
eggs to a uterus. However, many occasions
will arise in which the gamete providers or
others with decision-making authority over
embryos will want to discard embryos.").
168. See Opportunities and Advancements
Hearing, supra note 21 (testimony of J.
Davis); Paul C. Redman II & Lauren F.
Redman, Seeking a Better Solution for the
Disposition of Frozen Embryos: Is Embryo
Adoption the Answer? 35 TuLSA L.J. 583
(2000).
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